More day in the night? The gentrification of London’s night-time through clubbing

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Abstract. Since the 1990s, dance cultures played a key role in revitalizing post-industrial cities. As recent research indicates a correlation between the closure of music venues and gentrification processes, few studies explore how nightclubs are a central part of urban regeneration. The proposed article uses a governmentality framework to assess London’s 24-hour City Vision and the business model of a new mega-club, Printworks, funded by estate giant British Land, arguing that London’s attempt to ‘save nightlife’ requires a better understanding of the dynamic between the night-time economy and urban planning.

Keywords: electronic dance music culture, gentrification, London, night-time economy, technoculture.

1. Introduction

This article contributes to the debate about night-time economies (NTEs) and gentrification by further examining the role of clubbing in the regeneration of post-industrial cities. In the UK, where 50% of nightclubs have disappeared in the last decade, the link between clubbing and gentrification is recognized (Cafe 2016; Lima, Davies 2017). However, few studies explore how electronic dance music clubs are a central part of urban regeneration projects (Cohen, 1991; Malbon 1999; Rief 2009; Rietveld 1998). This article intends to shed light on this link with two case studies: a critical assessment of London’s 24-hour City Vision and South-East London’s new mega-club Printworks, which is at the heart of the urban regeneration project known as Canada Water Masterplan.

It is well-recognized that gentrification processes can lead to the closure of independent music venues. Since the 1980s, London clubs have prospered in areas that are particularly prone to gentrification, such as areas where commercial rates are cheap, post-industrial complexes outside city centres, and areas that are popular with young and ‘creative people’ (Hamnett, Whitelegg 2007; Harrop-Griffiths 2017; Sanders-McDonagh, Peyrefitte, Ryalls 2016; Wylie 2016). However, rising property prices and strict licensing legislation can strangle small- and medium-sized commercial ventures, including
clubs. Many are threatened with closure due to a mixture of unsustainable business models, legal actions, and evictions (Butcher, Dickens 2016; Campkin, Marshall 2017; Hae 2011, 2012; Vasudevan 2017).

Hae indicates that a central factor for the gentrification of mixed-use neighbourhoods is the nightlife fix, “a process through which the nightlife that nurtures diverse and alternative sub-cultures has been largely displaced and through which neighbourhoods are left with a simulacrum of urban vibrancy” (2011, 3461). In post-industrial urban regeneration, clubs and social dancing become part of the so-called ‘creative sector’ (Florida 2004), bringing the night-time to the centre of the debate about art and gentrification.

The role of the cultural industry in regeneration projects is multi-faceted. In Hoxton, a popular night-time area in London, a research by Harris identified that artists downplayed social conflicts caused by processes of residential gentrification (2012). At the same time, another research by Pratt indicates that artists produced positive social networks that were critical to the regeneration of Hoxton (2009, 1057). This tension illustrates that the night-time of British cities has both negative (social exclusion) and positive (economic and cultural) potential, giving rise to a renewed interest in the growth of urban night cultures and a related search for political leadership to address cyclical challenges (Hadfield 2015).

This article is primarily concerned with the role of clubbing in processes of place-making and presents the case study of Printworks, a mega-club built with the intention of adding residential and commercial value to its surrounding area. As finance companies invest directly in nightclubs, it is possible to talk of the financialization of clubbing. The article is also concerned with the role of public authorities in supporting an attractive ‘spatial’ and ‘night-time market’ for privately-led investments. This is a trajectory that can be traced in the neoliberal project of market-friendly state regulations aimed at replacing Fordist infrastructures with urban economies that can provide spatial opportunities for capital accumulation (Lees et al. 2016, 58-60).

In the following sections it will be argued that London’s clubbing industry is particularly attractive to key stakeholders of urban regeneration projects, including financial investors, thanks to the new vision for a ‘24-hour city’ published by the Greater London Authority (GLA), which is simultaneously facing strong oppositions from local boroughs, activists, and advocacy organisations, although for different reasons. Lastly, this article argues that the affinity between clubbing culture and urban regeneration may draw new lines of exclusion and inclusion.

The article uses a governmentality framework (Foucault 2004) to reconstruct a brief genealogy of the NTE discourse that focuses on the role of state actors in managing night-time and its subjects. In so doing, the contradictions inherent in ‘urban culture’ emerge. Clubbing is at the same time celebrated and condemned, redeemed and threatened, controlled and exploited. These contradictions suggest that London’s attempt to ‘save nightlife’ requires a better understanding of the dynamics between urban planning, night-time and clubbing.

2. Understanding the link between gentrification, night-time, and clubbing

Clubbing can be defined as an act of entertainment or social activity (Malbon 1999) through which people of different age, class, gender, ethnic background, religion, and political orientation experience and consume dance music (Garcia 2014; Rietveld 1998, 2004). In terms of spatial features, nightclubs are usually located in urban or peri-urban areas, versus outdoor rave parties and festivals that take place in forests or parks (McCall 2001; St John 2015; Collin 2018). Clubs are often converted former post-industrial properties like warehouses and factories (Bader, Scharenberg 2010; Vecchiola 2011; Brewster, Farley 2017), but they can also be purpose-designed by architects and visual artists, such as in the case of prominent discotheques (Darò 2009; Kries et al. 2018; Brewster 2018).

From the early 1980s, electronic music – a music genre and (sub)culture characterized by a machinic aesthetic that emerged in post-industrial cities such as Chicago and Detroit in the US and Berlin, Dusseldorf, Rotterdam, and Manchester in Europe (Botò 2015; Esch 2016; Rietveld, Kolioulis 2018; Sicko 1999) – has spread quickly and worldwide. Electronic music genres such as house, trance, and techno were popularized by the expansion of a globalized ‘technoculture’: dancing to electronic sounds and repetitive rhythms is the equivalent of experiencing this technoculture (Rietveld 2018). On a theoretical level, technoculture is defined by the dynamic relationship between the development of technologies and fluctuating social relations (Shaw 2008); in the context of electronic music, fast-paced genres such as techno are the outcome of an accelerated, hyper technologized society and are sustained by a ritualistic form of nomadic spiritualism (St. John 2004).

The link between techno music and technoculture, which cultural critic Adorno would have defined negatively in structural terms (1988), indicates that NTEs and clubbing should be considered not only as a product of a post-Fordist economy but, more decisively, also as a cul-
tural trait of an urban capitalist society. The rise of post-Fordism has increasingly blurred the boundaries between work and play, and between production and consumption. Within the post-Fordist cultural industry, nightclubs became productive when dance music scenes started to generate value associated with urban space and symbolic capital (Lange, Bürkner 2013). This process gave life to concepts such as the 24-hour city (Lovatt 1994; Gwiazdzinski 2002, 2008), night-time economy or NTE (Montgomery 1990; Lovatt, O’Connor 1995), and 24/7 capitalism (Crary, 2013). As the attention of researchers turned towards this new sphere of planning and culture, opportunities for innovation emerged (Gwiazdzinski 2002, 2015).

In the last 30 years, music venues in the UK have played an important role in the growth of NTEs that followed the repression of free rave parties in the 1990s. Clubs contributed to the regeneration and gentrification of post-industrial cities by attracting upper-income social groups into decaying urban centres at night (Lovatt 1994; Shaw 2010). Urban planners and policymakers sought to combat urban decline and its related consequences – crime, violence and anti-social behaviour – by favouring the creation of consumption-driven spaces (Lovatt, 1996). In doing so, however, night-time entertainment started to be recognised by policy makers as industries that “sustain lifestyle experimentation, cultural innovation, and the building of diverse communities” (Straw 2005, 194). In 2017, London’s NTE was valued at £26bn, with one in eight jobs being at night (GLA 2017).

Nightclubs are also a prime tourist attraction, such as in Ibiza (Reynolds 1998, 2013), Berlin (Garcia 2016) or, more recently, the Georgian capital Tbilisi (Lynch 2016). In the electronic music scene, Detroit and Berlin are regarded by fans as ‘Techno Cities’, expanding the meaning of place-making to city level (Collin 2018; Rietveld, Kolioulis 2018). It is argued that clubbing has contributed to the gentrification of popular areas in Berlin, with the rise of a ‘weekend lifestyle’ fuelled by low-cost air tickets, short-term lettings platforms and urban music festivals (Rapp 2009).

In the fields of human geography, queer and cultural studies, dance clubs have been identified as important spaces for marginalized groups such as LGBTQ+ communities, queer refugees, women and people of colour. This network of nightclubs shapes alternative geographies of affect, making urban night-time more conducive to social inclusion (Reddell 2013; Cattan and Vanolo 2014; Steinskog 2018). Queer spaces, however, are not only more at risk of closure due to residential and commercial gentrification, but their disappearance exacerbates the exclusion of marginalised groups (Talbot 2016; Campkin, Marshall 2018).

In light of these considerations, discourses about night-time continue to be as contentious as politically important. As Schlör argues, the night of big cities like London, Paris, and Berlin is an arena of conflicting powers and views; he equates these contradictions “to the unfinished, not quite perfect modernization of our society, our cities” (2016, 27). On the one hand police and religious leaders describe night-time activities as illegal or immoral; on the other hand the night has provided a time-space of encounters and free expression for writers, migrants, racialized people and the LGBTQ+ community (Beaumont 2015; Dunn 2016).

A second but closely linked tension associated with the city’s day-and-night-cycle is related to noise and light pollution. Noise pollution generated by revellers, musicians and clubbers is often denounced by residents and sanctioned by the police (Adams et al. 2006; Brands et al. 2015). The idea of a silent city resonates with high-income segments of the population and is associated with processes of social cleansing (Gandy 2014). Noise reduction rules, the increase of property prices and strict licensing policies were all contributing factors to residential and commercial gentrification in Brixton, Elephant and Castle, Hackney and Notting Hill, which are popular nocturnal areas that were all originally home to newcomers and racialized people in London (Hill 2015; Childs 2015; Weaver, Siddique 2016).

This brief discussion of the link between gentrification, night-time, and clubbing demonstrates the multidirectional impact of gentrification on clubbing: gentrification ‘silences’ night-clubs, yet clubbing culture is interwoven into urban space and its social fabric. Policy makers and urban planners can use clubs to leverage regeneration in post-industrial neighbourhoods. At the same time, independent music venues face negative consequences of residential and commercial gentrification, when real estate companies capitalize on the associated value that music and clubs bring to trendy urban neighbourhoods. The political discourse concerning the night has shifted from a focus on behaviours and moral values (policing) to one of ‘control at arm’s length’ with economic tools (NTEs). The next sections will explore this shift, with the dynamics of urban space and planning as the background.

3. More night in the day: from 24-hour parties to 24-hour cities.

“Dawn broke over the Manchester rooftops – cold, early light bringing the tall cranes into relief. Everywhere, the cranes that were building new loft apartments
blocks as fast as a kid with his Christmas morning Lego. Wilson wrapped his long black Yohji overcoat around himself and emerged onto the Haçienda roof to meditate a moment with a good view of his town, an overview as it were” (Wilson 2002, 254).

Taken from 24-hour party people, a novelization of the history of Factory Records, the label associated with the legendary Manchester’s club Haçienda, this quotation recognises the changes in the infrastructure of post-industrial cities. Throughout the 1980s, ‘Madchester’ was seen as an alternative mecca (Sicko 1999, 110). The city quickly absorbed and transformed electronic music. Thanks to clubs such as Haçienda, Manchester rose to worldwide fame for its thriving clubbing culture and the popularity of its acid house productions. In 1997, however, Haçienda went bankrupt and closed. Three years later, the club was sold, demolished, and transformed into luxury flats, marking the end of an era (Haslam 2001, 222).

A group of electronic music practitioners and researchers in Manchester foresaw these changes in 1994. They organized the First National Conference on the Night-time Economy to discuss the threats to the development of clubbing culture. Andrew Lovatt, one of the conference organizers, pointed out that European cities in industrial districts looked at night-time as an opportunity to replace the negative effects of de-industrialization (1994). Music spaces were increasingly seen as a place to consume ‘popular culture’. Cities in the North of England, the German Ruhr, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Northern France experienced an identity crisis as a result of widespread de-industrialization in the late 1970s. Thus, as companies were reluctant to sell both factories (or warehouses) and land (accounted as fixed capital), the revaluation of industrial centres was seen as an opportunity to be leveraged through processes of urban regeneration supported by local and regional governments (Lovatt 1996).

When hefty repression from state apparatuses led to the disappearance of the DIY free party movement (raves) from the UK in the mid 1990s, electronic dance music was pacified and de-collectivised. Club regulations were adjusted for safer public consumption and raves were transformed into warehouse parties (van Veen 2010). This model travelled abroad. For example, producers-turned-promoters organized warehouse parties in derelict factories in Chicago and Detroit, inspired by what they observed in the UK (Sextro, Wick 2011). At the same time, raves survived in other countries even more so after the wave of repression of the 1990s in the UK. The free party movement continued in France (Racine 2004), and thrived in Berlin, where abandoned sites in the Eastern part of the city were squatted to host weekend-long raves (Denk, Thülen 2014).

There is something specifically British about the integration of clubbing within the discourses, regulation and management of NTEs. As highlighted by Robert Shaw, there are structural links between the emergence of the idea of a 24-hour city and the ‘policy window’ through which concepts like urban entrepreneurialism entered the public debate. A 24-hour city model was sold to policy makers by, among others, the British think-tank Comedia and its founder Charles Landry, urban planner and author of The Creative City. This model fitted well with an emerging neoliberal hegemony in the UK and the consequent promotion of deregulation, creative entrepreneurship and market liberalization (Shaw 2010). The relationship between the regeneration of British cities and NTEs was therefore accompanied by a simultaneous promotion of the unique value of urbanization (Lovatt, O’Connor, 1995) which, according to Jessop, is a key trait of a neoliberal governmentality that seeks to accumulate capital and technologies through large-scale urbanization (2002).

As markets expanded into the night the perception of associated violence, exclusion and anti-social behaviour increased, facilitating the emergence of a discourse that linked nightlife and clubbing with issues of safety and security (Hobbs 2003; Brands et al. 2015). There have been attempts to link the rise in crime rates in the UK with the deregulation of licensed premises in the 1990s (Roberts 2009). However, this link remains largely unclear. In London, the perception of safety in and around nightclubs varies according to ‘situated’ perception of privately and publicly-enforced security (Hadfield 2008). As indicated by a comparative study of Sheffield, Manchester, and London, experiences of the 24-hour city vary greatly because people use and feel the city in different ways (Adams et al. 2006). Lastly, it is suggested that public pressure on issues of safety are caused by intra- and inter-urban competition between cities, which encourage zero-tolerance policing to increase the perception of safety (Belina, Helms 2003). In other words, the perceived increase in violence linked to the rise of NTEs in Britain has led to “mutually enabling strategies of control and market expansion [which] indicate a real shift in patterns of urban governance” (Hobbs et al. 2005, 176).

Although the link between NTE and security remains unclear, British authorities continue to impose and enforce strict licensing policies, citing safety, noise reduction, and crime control as the rationale for their decision-making processes. Against this background, in recent years there has been a backlash against strict
licencing and policing characterized by a growing discontent with the disappearance of independent music venues. The next section examines the political response to this ‘creativity crisis’ that followed the election of London’s mayor Sadiq Khan.

4. A critical assessment of London’s 24-hour city vision: from 24-hour city to 24-hour economy?

This section provides a critical assessment of London’s 24-hour city vision (L24V), a 44-page document called From good night to great night. A Vision For London As A 24-Hour City, published in July 2017 after a public consultation launched by London’s mayor Sadiq Khan, London’s Nightlife Czar Amy Lamé and Philip Kalvin, Chairman of the Night-Time Commission (GLA 2017).

L24V addresses a number of issues that Khan’s campaign team identified in 2015. Following his election in 2016 Khan promised to act on the concerns of #Save-nighlife, a campaign created by artists and club owners to denounce and oppose the closure of music venues in London (Weaver, Siddique 2016; Mance 2016; Harrop-Griffiths 2017). Many renowned clubs were shutting down or struggling. Dalston-based Dance Tunnel in the Borough of Hackney closed in 2016 (Coultate 2016); LGBTQ+ music venue The Joiners Arms in Hackney Road was due for demolition after its closure in 2015 to make space for a new residential development. Fabric, the legendary club in Farringdon, Islington which had its licence revoked for five months in 2016 after two teenagers died in its premises, eventually reopened after huge pressures from campaigners. Ministry of Sound, in the London Borough of Southwark, publicly opposed the construction of a residential block next to the club.

Mayor Khan appointed Amy Lamé, a Labour Party member and cabaret performer at the LGBT venue Royal Vauxhall Tavern, as London’s first Nightlife Czar. The role of the Nightlife Czar, a non-elected figure with special powers over a specific sector or issue, includes ‘night-time surgery’ visits and consultations with all nocturnal stakeholders, including businesses, residents, and community groups. In addition to the Czar, and with the objective of implementing L24V, Mayor Khan has appointed a Night Time Commission, whose members include, among others, a police commander, television and theatre directors, a DJ and a radio presenter, as well as the CEOs of London & Partners and Security Industry Authority. Another member of the Night Time Commission is Alan Miller, Chair of the Night Time Industries Association (NTIA). NTIA is a membership organisation that lobbies on behalf of clubs, bars and pubs; its members include famous nightclubs such as Fabric, Lightbox and Corsica Studios.

L24V should therefore be seen as the result of negotiations between the stakeholders involved in the deliberation of the policy. It is also a discourse on ‘nightlife governmentality’. The language used, the hypotheses presented or the stakeholders omitted, as well as the methods to achieve the intended outcomes are the object of this critical assessment.

In the opening letter of the document, Khan declares himself the mayor of residents and night-time workers, as well as of the nocturnal ‘creative class’, adding that: “I want London to be a global leader in the ways nightlife is planned. But we face great competition from Paris, New York, Berlin, Tokyo and San Francisco […] if we do not change the debate on nightlife, we will miss an opportunity to provide good jobs, economic growth and a high quality night culture for all Londoners” (GLA 2017, 5-6). From this point, L24V presents an NTE framework in which cities compete for night-life supremacy, rather than promoting cooperative dialogue and exchange with cities that have achieved a higher quality of night-life.

The vision continues with 10 guiding principles, which encompass traditional NTE concepts such as safety, accessibility and entrepreneurship, with new ideas influenced by the Brexit debate, like migration, global leadership and investment.

London By Night: 1. It will be a global leader. 2. It will provide vibrant opportunities for all Londoners, regardless of age, disability, gender, gender identity, race, religion, sexual orientation or means. 3. It will promote all forms of cultural, leisure, retail and service activities. 4. It will promote the safety and well-being of residents, workers and tourists. 5. It will promote a welcoming and accessible nightlife. 6. It will promote and protect investment, activity and entrepreneurship. 7. It will promote national and international visits to London. 8. It will be strategically positioned across London to promote opportunities and minimize impact. 9. It will become a 24-hour city that supports flexible lifestyles. 10 It will take into account future global and national trends in leisure, migration, technology, employment and the economy. (GLA 2017, 17)

For the purpose of this article, however, it is meaningful to look at Principle 9 (“Promote and Serve a 24-hour economy”) (GLA 2017, 36) more closely, as it indicates a shift in the discourse around 24-hour cities.

When read together, two sentences are particularly significant. “We must plan for life at night in the same way we do for the day” (GLA 2017, 13) and “We should
promote a 24-hour economy so that all Londoners can get the full benefit of what London has to offer (GLA 2017, 36). A vision that started by addressing the problems of London’s night-time ended up planning for a night managed in the same way as the day is managed. When the vision erases the differences between night-time and day-time needs of citizens and businesses, London’s NTE lose its specificity.

“It’s not just about pubs and clubs, although there is an undoubted market for more venues to open later at night. Nor does it mean that every venue in London has to open for 24 hours. It means simply that every Londoner should be able to access activity and services when they want to.” (GLA 2017, 36). The focus on access to services – arising from an economic framework – implies that public authorities see citizens as customers and the night as a market. Finally, L24V concludes with a commitment to “fostering a 24-hour city that balances the needs of all Londoners...[It] emphasises that developing London into a vibrant 24-hour city depends on partnership between public authorities, the private sector and communities.” (GLA 2017, 42).

It is undeniable that Mayor Khan is committed to solving London’s night-time problems. The appointment of the Czar, who is championing the capital’s night with knowledge and genuine interest, is a strong commitment to protecting and developing London’s night-time. For instance, the Mayor, the Czar and the Commission advocated effectively for the compulsory implementation of the ‘Agent of Change’, a principle that confers responsibility for the change on the person or the business generating the impact of that change. The principle prevented the closure of Ministry of Sound and Corsica Studios, two clubs located in Elephant and Castle, in the London Borough of Southwark, forcing property developers to finance soundproofing.

However, based on a critical assessment of L24V and in light of recent news that signals the ongoing challenges of the capital’s night-time – this article argues that the vision and its underlying governmentality do not stretch far enough to identify or address underlying conflicts and real political alternatives. As it stands, L24V seems more like an exercise to promote the city, rather than a vision that can set the right tone to produce new legislation able to solve the challenges of London’s night-time.

A significant deficiency of L24V is the lack of references to policies that preceded it. For instance, studies of noise reduction policies, including the City of London Master Plan (GLA 2012), provide a more complex analysis of London’s space, where neighbourhoods are analysed in their singular quality (Adams et al. 2006), escaping simple conceptualizations of the urban (Atkinson 2007). L24V instead offers a city-wide solution that neglects the granularity of London Boroughs’ unique characteristics. This is perhaps linked to the very nature of the GLA, a regional governance body with limited powers over the Boroughs of London.

Secondly, by sticking to an NTE framework, L24V seems more concerned with turning London’s creativity into an economic output, rather than formulating a strategy for its sustainability. In so doing, it disregards the social and economic factors that enable artistic production (housing, commercial rents and educational opportunities). London could look at examples from other cities like Berlin, where the local Club Commission successfully advocated for the funding of nightclubs, thus recognizing their vital role in the artistic landscape. A comparative analysis between two clubs - Fabric in London and Berghain in Berlin – shows that unless there is political will to recognize, protect and finance nightclubs as cultural centres, establishments like these can become seen simplistically as the cause or the effect of gentrification processes and its related ‘anti-social’ problems (Garcia 2018).

L24V dismisses important findings of other studies of gentrification, including a recent study by UCL researchers Professor Ben Campkin and Laura Marshall, which highlighted dynamics of appearance and disappearance of LGBTQ+ premises after London boroughs were given more flexibility to implement urban regeneration plans in 1986. Over the last thirty years, LGBTQ+ spaces that are open mainly to Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic people (BAME), have been particularly vulnerable to closures (Campkin, Marshall 2016). A second study, which covers the period from 2006 to 2016, examines the causes behind the closure of 116 LGBTQ+ spaces. In 38% of cases the closure was due to regeneration of the host building, which was often transformed into apartments. In 21% of cases the premises remained open but their use changed. Another frequent cause behind the closure of LGBTQ+ clubs was the renegotiation of licenses or a sudden increase in commercial rents (7%) (Campkin, Marshall 2017). These two studies suggest the need for a focus on the night-time’s most marginalised groups. The GLA could offer subsidies to community organisations, cap rents, clarify planning rules and provide more relaxed licences to help sustain important LGBTQ+ spaces. These ‘safe spaces’ provide a vital infrastructure for London’s communities (Campkin, Marshall 2018).

The partnership approach of the Commission, along with the limited consultative nature of the Czar’s role, fails to compensate for asymmetries of power between different stakeholders. Although minutes of the meetings are publicly available, it remains unclear how conflicting agendas are effectively discussed and resolved. While
L24V strives to achieve a vision that could work for all Londoners, the vision should adopt a focus on the most vulnerable nocturnal actors. Homeless people, precarious workers, artists on low-income, and young people of colour (often the first to suffer the negative consequences of regeneration plans), should be at the centre of the Mayor’s efforts. But they are not. Instead, the vision aims to find the optimal framework to boost London’s NTE, as if the benefits of a growing 24-hour economy would pour down upon its citizens as freely as the city’s rain.

In the current form, the vision fails to be innovative and risks exacerbating some of the underlying causes of London’s nightlife problems. As L24V does not mention the word ‘gentrification’ one single time, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Czar Lamé received a wave of criticisms from residents, anti-gentrification activists and business owners within London’s NTE. The Czar and the Commission find themselves trapped between the demands of boroughs on the one hand, and a mix of citizens with different needs and agendas on the other.

As protests to #Savenightlife continued in 2018 (Hawthorn 2018; O’Sullivan 2018), more could have been done to recognize the varied and sometimes conflicting needs of London’s night-time stakeholders. Two recent examples are noteworthy. In July 2018, Hackney’s mayor, Philip Glanville, has implemented new restrictions on licencing which could injure East London’s NTE. The curfew provoked an uproar among night-friendly campaigners and prompted a protest led by We Love Hackney (Wilson 2019). The backlash overwhelmed the Czar, who was accused of lacking leadership or strategy. It also highlighted underlying tensions between regional and local powers, which are as political as administrative: the GLA does not have the power to implement specific NTE legislation on London boroughs.

In December 2018 there was another ‘scandal’ in the club scene, as it was confirmed that the nightclub Corsica Studios will receive £125,000 for soundproofing from the same developer that is behind the demolition of the Elephant market and Latin venues in Elephant and Castle. Anti-gentrification activists pointed out that institutional racism is ‘saving clubs’ at the expense of working-class migrants and small club owners (Cetin 2018). This turns the spotlight back onto the role of clubs in regeneration projects.

5. More day in the night: the gentrification of London’s night-time through clubbing

Printworks is one of the successes of the new night-time celebrated by L24V. Printworks is a 119,000 sq. ft mega-club in Canada Water, which can host up to 5,000 people. Launched in 2017, the club is part of the £4bn regeneration of Canada Water led by British Land, one of the largest companies in the field of property development in the UK. British Land has plans to build up to 3,000 new homes next to Surrey Quays’ Greenland Dock, and to refurbish the Surrey Quays Shopping Centre located next to Canada Water underground station. The Canada Water Masterplan (CWM), which was submitted for approval in May 2018, markets a “live, work, play” housing model, which hopes to attract young professionals and families to the area.

The mega-club Printworks is a core component of CWM. It attracts new buyers to the area by creating social value through clubbing. It also allows developers to enter new partnerships and markets. As the 2017 annual report by British Land states: “we have created an exciting new events space at the Printworks to raise the public profile of the area and to generate income, as well as testing the appetite for this kind of facility within our plans” (British Land 2017). One year and 200,000 visitors later, British Land was proud to announce that “the space has proved to be such a commercial success, as well as an effective driver of footfall, that it has now been incorporated into our development plans.” (British Land 2018).

Printworks was initially slated for closure after a seven-year period, but the success of the club suggests that British Land will continue with this experiment. The political environment is also favourable. With London’s public institutions keen to publicise quick successes in the NTE, the partnership between the public (City Hall/London Borough of Southwark) and the private sector (British Land/Printworks) could represent a viable solution to the challenges at the intersection of night-time, clubbing and gentrification. Nevertheless, this new model further complicates the relationship between clubbing and gentrification.

As discussed previously, the recent debate concerning London’s NTE was dominated by the discourse that clubs suffer the negative consequences of processes of gentrification. This is confirmed by trends that see clubs disappearing from the night-map. While some prominent nightclubs are being saved, others are forced to close. Printworks brings yet another layer of complexity. The club is used by a company to generate income and value. In other words, technoculture is used for placemaking, speculating on the hype generated by London’s newest mega-club.

It is recognised how financial extraction hinges on local networks that cooperate formally or informally to generate value (Hardt, Negri 2017). However, the direct
investment of a property developer in the club scene is the first sign of a new process that could be defined by the expression ‘financialization of clubbing’. With this expression I would like to indicate not only an economic process, but also a transformation of clubbing into a tradable urban product. Warehouses can be transformed into a venue with few arrangements and a sound system. This is a profitable way of creating value, ensuring good revenues with relatively small costs. It connects young people and professionals with a future-oriented technoculture, which confers a higher symbolic value on urban transformations.

The consequences for clubbers can be seen in the distinct features of the club. Printworks is located where the newspapers Daily Mail and Evening Standard went to print and was converted into a club by leaving the internal structure almost unaltered. The club features impressive line-ups with many Resident Advisor Top 100 DJs. It is open most Saturdays from 2pm to 11pm, and tickets are expensive, between £25 and £45 (more expensive than smaller clubs like Corsica Studios, which charges around £15 for events running from 10pm to 6am). Inside the venue, dozens of private security patrol the dancefloor, assisted by a visible network of cameras. Secured VIP areas can be accessed with an upgrade, along the lines of the Kafkaesque booking systems of low-cost airlines. Finally, Printworks is a day-time club. Day-time parties are not new, but they are normally the province of clubbers looking for after-parties. However, Printworks can neither function as an after-party (the 2 pm start is too late), nor can it be categorized as a night-club with its 11pm closing time. It stands for something new - a pre-party set that fits with a 9-5 office life.

Printworks’ business model has an affinity with the governmentality framework of L24V. If the 1990s brought ‘more night in the day’, these initiatives suggest that policy makers and the private sector are partnering to bring ‘more day in the night’. Both attempt to overcome London’s night-time problems with day-time solutions. L24V views night-time specific problems as 24-hour problems. Printworks is celebrated by NTE advocates but in reality is a day-time club that offers more opportunities for the middle-class. More generally, L24V and Printworks indicate the lack of adequate solutions to resolve the negative impacts of gentrification on clubbing; as well as the controversial – and often overlooked – role of clubs in regeneration projects. What is missing is a focus on the most liminal in our society that live during the night-time. Failing or ignoring to do so will only bring more discontent and leave London’s night-time unsustainable and inaccessible.

6. Conclusions

Through an analysis of the discourses concerning London’s night-time and its impact on the most marginalised subjects, this article argues that London’s attempt to ‘save nightlife’ requires a better understanding of the dynamic between clubbing, NTEs, and urban planning. To address London’s night-time problems, it is not enough to simply integrate the opportunities of NTEs into planning. The disparity between a growing NTE and the disappearance of independent music venues highlights a concentration of clubs in the hands of fewer owners. This should prompt action by public institutions to implement effective measures to protect people and businesses at the greatest risk of displacement.

London’s public institutions are failing to create a plan that recognizes the diversity of London’s clubbing infrastructure. This omission can be attributed to a neoliberal governmentality that led Mayor Khan, the Night Czar and the Night-Time Commission to promote a vision for a 24-hour economy that could aggravate the underlying causes of the closure of music venues. Big clubs seem to thrive with the support of partnerships between the public and the private sectors, but independent venues continue to struggle. I define this shift as the ‘financialization of clubbing’. Lastly, while clubs usually suffer from the negative consequences of gentrification plans, there is evidence that developers are actively using clubs to regenerate urban areas by creating value associated with their presence.

To conclude, there are solutions that night-time advocates could bring to the table. London’s night-time should be democratized. Londoners could elect a Night-Time Parliament and do away with the Night-Time Commission and the Czar. A Night-Time Parliament could then advocate for the centralization of powers back to the GLA, and away from local authorities for matters related to night-time. Public authorities should set up a Night Fund to support clubs, social spaces and artists that are vital to London’s diversity. More generally, night-time advocates should rethink attitudes towards safety, anti-social behaviour and noise, considering more relaxed licencing regulations. They could also look at the legalisation of some illegal substances to avoid detrimental and expensive zero-tolerance policies. This has proved effective in cities like Amsterdam and Berlin. Finally, club owners, artists, and clubbers should be more proactive, advocating for better working and housing conditions for all night-time workers.
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