Against Plural Comprehension

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36253/jpm-3294

Keywords:

plural logic, second-order logic, plural comprehension, plurals

Abstract

Plural primitivism is the idea that plural expressions cannot be dispensed with in favor of singular expressions. Our current standard first-order logic is based on the opposite idea, singularism, that plural expressions are eliminable in terms of singular expressions. Hence, plural primitivism suggests replacing first-order logic with what is nowadays called plural logic. One prominent axiom of plural logic is the axiom scheme of plural comprehension (PCA). This article aims to critically examine the plural primitivist claim of the logicality of PCA.

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Published

2025-12-30

How to Cite

Fujimoto, K. (2025). Against Plural Comprehension. Journal for the Philosophy of Mathematics, 2, 9–34. https://doi.org/10.36253/jpm-3294

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Articles