Libertà e autoinganno
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36253/rifp-2794Parole chiave:
libertà, autoinganno, autonomiaAbstract
L’articolo analizza il concetto di autoinganno ponendolo in relazione con la questione della libertà negativa e positiva. Dopo aver analizzato la specificità del fenomeno dell’autoinganno, il testo propone di limitare i suoi possibili esiti negativi attraverso il ricorso al precommitment da parte dell’individuo razionale.
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